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Abstract 
In this paper we study mediation when two countries might fight a war over the ownership of a resource. Under 
complete information mediation is always successful, but a little bit of asymmetric information or some imperfect 
observability may render mediation impossible 
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1 Introduction
Rationalist theories of war explain conict as the rational choice of countries
see Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas (2002), Jackson and Morelli (2007) and the
surveys by Garnkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Jackson and Morelli (2011).
This approach has studied how trade, long term relationships or availability
of resources may amplify or e¤ace the incentives of war, see Skaperdas and Sy-
ropoulos (1996), (2001), Garnkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Beviá and Corchón
(2010). In the latter paper, it is shown that, under complete information if re-
source inequality is not very large and the outcome of war is neither too sensitive
nor too insensitive to war expenses, a war fought in terms of a "decisive battle"
-a battle that will give control of all the remaining resources to the victor- can
be stopped by means of transfers from the "rich" to the "poor" country. As
Clausewitz (1832) noted, war is seldom fought on these terms.1 More often war
takes place when two countries dispute a resource.2 The war ends when one of
the countries decisively defeats the other and gains control over the resource.
In this paper we address the following question: Are there self-enforcing
divisions of a resource under dispute? In other words, are there divisions of the
resource such that, if attained, both countries have incentives to respect?
We consider two setups. The rst, which we call the Unmediated Game has
two stages. In the rst stage countries decide if they declare war or not. If one
of the countries decides to declare war, in the second stage there is war. If both
countries decide not to ght there is peace and they get zero payo¤s.
In the second setup, which we call the Mediated Game, there is a mediator
whose objective is to achieve peace. This mediator designs and implements
a partition of the resource. Once this partition has been implemented and
both countries have taken possession of their share in the resource, we have
1An example in which one of the sides was beaten so decisively that it dissapeared from
history was the defeat of the Visigoths by the Arabs in the river Guadalete in southern Spain,
711.
2Modern examples include the Scramble for Africa between all major European powers in
1881-1914 and the Great Game between British and Russian empires in 1813-1907.
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the same situation as in the unmediated game, i.e., countries may declare war,
etc. Thus the mediator can alter the initial conditions of the game but she
cannot stop further conict. We are aware that we endow the mediator with
considerable powers. But if such a mediator fails to obtain peace, mediators
with less power will fail too. Thus our study may be interpreted as providing
necessary conditions for mediation to be successful.
In some cases the mediator can be thought to be a real person like in the
treaty of Tordesillas (1494) in which the Pope suggested a division of south
America between Spain and Portugal (which lasted up to the end of Spanish
and Portuguese domination in the Americas). In others the mediator is just a
surrogate of the bargaining of both countries about the shares of the resource.
Finally we may think of a distribution of the resource achieved for historical or
geographical reasons or by a previous conict like in the case of Cyprus.3
We rst study complete information. In the unmediated case war is the
only equilibrium (Proposition 1). The explanation is that countries can always
choose war e¤orts in such a way that expected payo¤s from war are positive. In
the mediated case, we show that there is a division of the resource such that, in
any equilibrium, both countries will choose peace (Proposition 2). The reason
for this result is that the status quo for each country is its share of the resource
and the possibility of losing it should war occur makes countries reluctant to go
to war. In contrast with Beviá and Corchón (2010) this result does not depend
on resource inequality or on how war expenses a¤ect the outcome of the war.
Next we consider asymmetric information. We assume that country one
has private information about how valuable the resource is. In particular, this
country may have a high or a low valuation.4 As an illustration we may think
that country one has done research on the existence of a valuable resource in
3Mediation has been widely considered in mechanism design following the inuencial work
of Myerson (1982 (see also Crawford and Sobel (1982)). However, the issue there is the
incentives of agents to correctly reveal the information they possess to the mediator. In our
model there is no transmission of information from agents to the mediator.
4We show that private information about other parameters of the game are equivalent to
private information about valuations.
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a territory under dispute and the result of the test is only in the hands of this
country only. We assume that the mediator cannot distinguish between the two
valuations (types) of country one. Thus, in order to achieve peace, she has to
devise a partition of the resource such that country one has incentives to remain
peaceful no matter its type. We show that if this country is peaceful under high
valuation it is peaceful under low valuation. Thus, the share to this country is
dictated by its high valuation. We will see that this is one of the key ingredients
of the failure of mediation to achieve peace under asymmetric information.
We prove that under no mediation, war is the unique Bayesian equilibrium
of the asymmetric information game (Proposition 3). Under mediation, we show
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for peace to hold as the unique Bayesian
equilibrium (Proposition 4). This condition holds when
1. It is very likely that the valuation of country one is high.
2. The high and the low valuations of country one are similar.
3. The strength of country two is low.
4. The valuation of country two is low.
Points 1 and 2 are very intuitive because, when uncertainty is small we are
back, essentially, to the full information scenario. Points 3 and 4 are explained
because when the strength/valuation of country two is low, it will not fare well
in war, so a small share of the resource would be enough to keep it peaceful.
Conversely war is likely to arise in the following cases (proposition 5)
1. Low probability that country one has a high valuation
2. Large dispersion in the valuations of country one.
3. The strength of country two is large.
4. Large valuation of country one.
Again Points 2-4 are intuitive. But Point 1 is completely counterintuitive. It
says that mediation fails when we are very close to complete information! The
explanation is that the share of country one is dictated by its high valuation.
But when this country is weak with a high probability, war looks like a good
prospect for country two, so this country needs a high share for peace. Thus,
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being close to complete information might be bad for peace!5
So far we have considered the actions of players to be perfectly observable.
However, as Data Fusion emphasizes, information about true actions is seldom
reliable. The purpose of our paper is not directed to its foundations (see, e.g.
Herrera, Herrera-Viedma and Verdegay, 1996) but to its consequences on the
achievement of war and peace. In particular we assume that the declaration of
war is imperfectly observable. This might be due to unreliability of communi-
cation channels like when Japan declared war on the US in 1941 but got the
timing wrong and thus the attack on Pearl Harbor came before the war dec-
laration. Also, if we understood war declaration not as a letter, but as taking
certain actions that can only mean war, i.e., putting a eet or tanks in attacking
position, launching planes or rockets, etc. these actions could be imperfectly
observed by the other country.6
To simplify our calculations, we assume that both countries have identical
war strengths. We show that under imperfect observability, war is the only
equilibrium outcome of the unmediated game (proposition 7). Under mediation,
we nd a necessary and su¢ cient condition for peace to be feasible. We show
that this condition is likely to be met when
1. The observability errors are small
2. The inequality in the valuations of countries is small, too.
Point 1 is very intuitive because if errors are small, we are close to complete
information. However, Point 2 is not obvious. Moreover, we show that, given
any degree of imperfect observability, a su¢ ciently large di¤erence in valuations
makes peace impossible (Propositions 8, 9 and 10). This is because if one of the
countries is stronger in valuations, its benets under conict are greater than
5 Invoking the Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983) theorem to explain the failure of mediation in
our case might be misleading because the assumptions needed for the theorem to hold do not
necessarily hold here; see Corchón (2009) for a discussion. Also in our case, there is incomplete
contracting because nothing can stop war if countries decide so. Thus, as usual, asymmetric
information wreaks havoc on our model, but the reason for this is, in some cases, a subtle one.
6An example of this is the Nazi invation of USSR in 1941 which despite all preparations
-and even warnings- came as a surprise to the soviet leaders.
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under mediation, resulting in a more arduously achievable mediation. Thus,
under imperfect observability, mediation failure is not as extreme as it could
be under asymmetric information where mediation can fail for all values in a
sequence of  tending to zero. Under imperfect observability, mediation failures
can only happen when q or o tend to one and  to zero (or innite).
The rest of the paper goes as follows. Section 2 spells the model. Section 3
studies the full information case. Section 4 considers asymmetric information.
Section 5 studies imperfect observability. Finally, Section 6 gathers our nal
comments.
2 The Model
Two countries dispute a resource which they value in V1 and V2 respectively. In
case of war, they incur irrecuperable expenses of G1 and G2.
Let pi be the probability that country i = 1; 2 wins the war. It could also
be interpreted as the share of i in the resource after the war. pi is determined
by an asymmetric contest success function of the following form:
pi =
iG

iP2
j=1 jG

j
(1)
 2 [0; 1] measures the responsiveness of the probability of winning to expenses.
When  = 1, the probability of winning is proportional to relative war e¤orts,
and when  = 0, the probability of winning is independent of war e¤orts.
i 2 (0;1) is the productivity of country i in war e¤orts. Dening   2=1
as the relative productivity of country two in war, the contest success function
can be written as:
p1 =
G1
G1 + G

2
and p2 =
G2
G1 + G

2
, (2)
where  2 (0;1) is the relative productivity of country two in war e¤orts.
Both countries are risk-neutral. In case of war, their expected payo¤s are
u1 = V1
G1
G1 + G

2
 G1 and u2 = V2 G

2
G1 + G

2
 G2; (3)
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We consider two setups. In the rst one, which we call the Unmediated Game,
countries decide in the rst stage if they declare war or not. If one of the
countries declares war, in the second stage, the conict is waged and payo¤s are
delivered. If both countries decide not to declare war, they obtain zero payo¤s.
In the second setup, which we call the Mediated Game, there is a mediator
whose objective is to achieve peace. The mediator designs a partition of the
resource and has the power to implement this partition. Once both countries
have taken possession of their share in the resource, we have the same situation
as in the unmediated game: countries may engage in war, but in this case, the
payo¤s of peace are the shares of the resource given by mediation.
3 Full Information Case
Assume that all the parameters dening the game are common knowledge be-
tween the two countries. We solve the game beginning with the second stage.
Assuming that there is war, rst order conditions (FOC) of expected payo¤
maximization for each country are:
@u1
@G1
= V1
G 11 G

2
(G1 + G

2 )
2 = 1 = V2
G 12 G

1
(G1 + G

2 )
2 =
@u2
@G2
(4)
It can be veried that these conditions are also su¢ cient. Thus, the e¤orts
under war are given by (4). This implies that
V2
V1
=
G2
G1
. (5)
Plugging (5) in (4) and dening  

V2
V1

, we obtain the full information war
e¤ort, GFi , for i = 1; 2.
GF1 =
V1
(1 + )
2 (6)
GF2 =
V2
(1 + )
2 (7)
Substituting expressions (6) and (7) in (3), we obtain the equilibrium payo¤ for
each country:
uF1 =
V1 [1 +  (1  )]
(1 + )
2 (8)
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uF2 =
V2 (1 +    )
(1 + )
2 (9)
We check that payo¤s are strictly positive. Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 Under complete information, war is the unique equilibrium of
the unmediated game.
Let us now study the mediated game under the assumption that the mediator
knows all parameters that dene the game. Suppose the mediator suggests
that country one take a share " 2 (0; 1) in the resource. For peace to hold in
equilibrium, the following condition should hold for the rst country.
uF1 =
V1 [1 +  (1  )]
(1 + )
2  "V1: (10)
which amounts to
1 +  (1  )
(1 + )
2  " (11)
Performing a similar calculation for the second country, we obtain
"  1 +  (1 + )
(1 + )
2 : (12)
Then, if peace is achieved, conditions (11) and (12) imply
1 +  (1  )
(1 + )
2  " 
1 +  (1 + )
(1 + )
2 (13)
Thus, peace is possible i¤
1 +  (1 + )
(1 + )
2 
1 +  (1  )
(1 + )
2 (14)
which always holds while,  2 [0; 1]. We have proved the following:
Proposition 2 Under complete information, there is a division of the resource
such that peace is the unique equilibrium of the mediated game.
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4 Asymmetric Information
In this section, we take into account that some parameters of the game are
privately known. This may be when valuation Vi or war productivity i is known
by country i while country j has beliefs about the values of these variables. In
order to simplify our calculations, we assume that  = 1.
We rst show that both sources of uncertainty -valuation or war productivity-
are equivalent when  = 1. In this case, the payo¤ functions are:
ui = Vi
iGiP2
j=1 jGj
 Gi (15)
Dening a new decision variable i = iGi, we rewrite (15) as follows:
ui = Vi
i
1 + 2
  i
i
(16)
Now multiplying both sides of the equation with i, we have that
vi = iVi
i
1 + 2
  i (17)
where vi is the scaled utility of the conict for each country and in which the
productivity in conict e¤orts and valuations play the same role. Thus, without
loss of generality, we assume that valuations are the only source of uncertainty.
In order to focus on the simplest case, we assume that only country one has
private information about V1 2 fV; V g where  2 [0; 1], and the probability
that V1 = V is . When country one has valuation V (resp. V ), her war e¤ort
is G1 (resp. G1). We also dene here the ratio of the valuations, , as the
valuation of the second country in terms of the valuation of the high-type rst
country, i.e.,  = V2V .
As we did in the previous section, we begin by analyzing war in the unmedi-
ated case. In this case, payo¤s in case of conict for the rst country are:
u1 = V
G1
G1 + G2
 G1 (18)
u1 = V
G1
G1 + G2
 G1 (19)
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Since payo¤ functions are concave, using the FOCs, the best reply functions of
the rst country according to her valuation are:7
G1 =
p
V G2   G2 (20)
G1 =
p
V G2   G2 (21)
The utility of the second country is:
u2 = V2

G2
G1 + G2

+ V2 (1  )

G2
G1 + G2

 G2 (22)
The FOC for the second country is:
V2
G1 
G1 + G2
2 + (1  )V2 G1
(G1 + G2)
2 = 1 (23)
Note that the payo¤ function is concave. Substituting (21) and (20) into the
equation above, we obtain the equilibrium e¤orts for the second country :
G2 =
V

"
1    1 p

 + 1   (1  )
#2
(24)
Substituting (24) into (21) and (20), we nd the equilibrium arming by a high
and low value type as follows:
G

1 = V
p



 + (1  )

1 p  1   1 p

 + 1   [1  ]
2 (25)
G1 = V


   
p


1 p  1   1 p

 + 1   [1  ]
2 (26)
Assuming
p
   1 p, we obtain G1  0 as desired. Then, using the
payo¤ functions of the conict of each type and each country, i.e., equations
(18), (19), and (22) we get the following equilibrium payo¤s for each country:
For a high-valuation rst country:
u1 = V
"

 + (1  )
 
1 p

 + 1   (1  )
#2
(27)
7Here we disregard non-negativity constraints. Later on, we will make an assumption that
will make sure that war e¤orts are indeed positive.
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For a low-valuation rst country:
u1 = V
"

   
 
1 p

 + 1   (1  )
#2
(28)
Finally, for the second country:
u2 = V2
[1   (1  )] 1    1 p2

 + 1   (1  )
2 (29)
We check that payo¤s are strictly positive. Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 3 Under asymmetric information war is the unique equilibrium
of the unmediated game.
We now focus on the mediated case. We assume that the mediator does not
know the type of country one. Thus, her proposed share of the resource, ", can-
not depend on the type of this country. Thus, for peace to hold in equilibrium,
the following conditions should be satised:
u1  "V
u1  "V
u2  (1  ")V2
Using equations (27), (28), and (29), we nd the following conditions for peace
to hold in equilibrium: "

 + (1  )
 
1 p
V
V2
+ 1   (1  )
#2
 " (30)
"

   
 
1 p

 + 1   (1  )
#2
 " (31)
1  [1   (1  )]

1    1 p2

 + 1   (1  )
2  " (32)
Note that the left-hand side of inequality (30) is always larger than the left-
hand side of inequality (31). That implies that (31) is not binding, i.e., peace
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holds in equilibrium for the low-valuation rst country as long as it holds for
the high-valuation rst country. Hence, the condition for peace is reduced to
1  [1   (1  )]

1    1 p2

 + 1   (1  )
2 
"

 + (1  )
 
1 p

 + 1   (1  )
#2
(33)
Rearranging (33), we reach the following result for peace to hold in equilibrium:
Proposition 4 Peace is the unique equilibrium of the mediated game i¤
1


 (1  )  1 p2 n(1  )2   2o
2
p

 
1    1 p (34)
The right-hand side of (34) will be denoted as F (; ). Recall the denitions
of the parameters involved in (34):
 is the ratio between V2 and V1
 is the relative strength of country two
V is the low value of V1
 is the probability that V1 is high
If the right hand side of (34) is negative, the inequality is fullled automatically
and mediation can be successful. This occurs i¤ (1  )2 =2 < . Thus, peace
has a good chance if  is as close to one as possible (so both types have similar
valuations) or when  is close to one so the probability that the valuation is
high is overwhelming. In both cases, the uncertainty is small.
When the right-hand side of (34) is non-negative (i.e., (1  )2 =2  ),
things are more involved. Let us discuss the role of each parameter separately.
The roles of  and  are clear. When the strength of country two or its
valuation is low, peace holds because this country could only demand a small
share and this is always feasible.
To nd the role of , we partially di¤erentiate the right-hand side of (34)
with respect to  and nd the following expression: 2 + 2  1 +p p  p  12
23=2
: (35)
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The term (
p
 1)2
23=2
is always positive. Therefore, the sign of this derivative
depends on the following expression, which we dene as a function, K (; ), as
follows.
K (; ) =  2 + 2 (1 +p) p: (36)
It is a matter of simple calculation to see that there exists a b 2 (0; 1) such that
K (; ) = 0; indeed, b = 2+p
2(1+
p
)
. However, recall that peace certainly holds if
(1  )2 =2 < . Now let us dene
L (; ) = (1  )2   2
First of all, L (; ) is strictly decreasing in , as @L(;)@ =  2 (1  ) 2 < 0.
Solving L (; ) = 0, there is a critical value for , c =  1+
p

 1+ such that
L (c; ) = 0.8 Now realize that c < b, 8 2 (0; 1), implying that the peace
condition is fullled at b and beyond. Thus we conclude that a large value of
 gives peace a good chance. This is very intuitive because uncertainty is very
small. However, a su¢ ciently low value of  makes war very likely. Indeed when
 ' 0, the condition for war is, approximately,
2

p
 
1 p2 < : (37)
The left-hand side is increasing in , so in this case, war arises as a combination
of a low probability of country one being of the high type, a large valuation
and/or strength of country two and small a valuation for the low type. In all
these cases, the share demanded by the high type looks too expensive for country
two, which has good chances of winning a sizeable chunk of the prize by going
to war.
It is remarkable that despite the fact that when  = 0, war cannot happen
in the mediated case (see Proposition 2), war is perfectly possible when  is
very close to zero. Even more, war is more likely the closer the value of  is to
zero. This reveals an interesting discontinuity in the prevention of war.
8The other solution is  =  1 
p

 1+ =2 (0; 1).
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Finally, it is easily seen that @F (;)@ < 0 for F (; )  0. Again, if  is
close to 1, F (; ) is close to 0 and peace has a fair chance. This is because we
are close to complete information. But if  is low, F (; ) could be large and
make peace impossible. This is because the low type will make very little e¤ort
in war and will lose it with a high probability but its share in the resource is
determined by the high type, so war looks like a good prospect for country two.
Summing up, from the discussion above, we learn the following:
Proposition 5 Failure of mediation under incomplete information is due to:
1. Large dispersion in the valuation of countries.
2. Large relative strength of country two.
3. Low probability that country one has a high valuation
4. Large dispersion in the valuations of country one.
The mechanism under which war occurs is that country one appears, in
expected terms, as a weak opponent in war, but successful mediation demands
that the share of this country is given by the characteristics of the high type.
We now study the expected cost of war, which we measure by expected
war expenses. Thus, we consider only a part of the destruction brought by
war; civilian casualties, capital losses and the like are disregarded. As a further
simplication we assume that  =  = 1. Using equations (24), (25) and (26),
we obtain the expected cost of war:
A (; ) = G2 + G

1 + (1  )G1 = V
p

h

 p
  12 (1  ) +pi
1 + + (  1) (38)
We obtain that @A (:; ) =@ equals to
 V
1 + 2
 p
  12  p+ 1+ 2   32 + 2 p  +  32   1
[1 +  (  1) + ]2 (
p
  1)p
The expression outside the numerator is positive. Hence, the sign of this deriv-
ative depends on the expression in the numerator. Now let us dene
J(; ) = 1 + 2 (
p
  1)2 (p+ 1) + 2   32 + 2
p
  +  32   1

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If J(; ) > 0 for  2 (0; 1), and for any  2 (0; 1), then expected cost of war is
increasing in . Now observe that J (0; ) = 1 + 2  3=2 > 0. Since
@J (:; )
@
= 2 (
p
  1) (1 + +  (  1)) < 0
J(; ) > 0. This result enables us to state the proposition below.
Proposition 6 Given  = 1,  = 1 the cost of war is strictly increasing in .
It can be shown that the cost of war is also increasing in  but the proof is
cumbersome and is available upon request.
An interesting exercise would be to maximize the cost of war subject to the
condition that mediation is unsuccessful. Unfortunately, such an exercise yields
expressions that are intractable. We were not able to produce an example in
which the cost of war exceeds V=4. Given that, under no mediation the cost
of war may be as high as V=2 (for  =  = 1), this suggests that mediation
prevents the most costly wars, but more work would be needed on this issue.
5 Imperfect Observability
In this section, we assume that the declaration of war is imperfectly observable.
In order to simplify the picture, assume that  =  = 1. Suppose, say, country
two decides to declare war. In such a case, country one perceives a probability
q 2 (0; 1) that she faces an army G2 strong and with probability 1  q that she
perceives that the other country is peaceful.9 In the case analyzed so far, q = 1.
Thus, expected payo¤s for player one in cases in which she declares war are
u1 = q(
G1
G1 +G2
V1  G1) + (1  q)(V1  G1); (39)
and similarly for country two, i.e.
u2 = q(
G2
G1 +G2
V2  G2) + (1  q)(V2  G2): (40)
9A more general assumption would be that country one observes di¤erent values of G2
with certain probabilities. Reasons of tractability inclined us towards the simple assumption
used in the main text.
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First-order conditions of payo¤ maximization are
G2
(G1 +G2)2
V1 =
1
q
and
G1
(G1 +G2)2
V2 =
1
q
; (41)
so we obtain G2=G1 =  as before. Equilibrium values of war expenses are:
G1 =
qV1
(1 + )2
and G2 =
qV2
(1 + )2
. (42)
Notice that these values of war expenses are "rational expectation" values in the
sense that they are the correct anticipation made by players taking into account
the imperfections of the problem.
Finally, plugging the values of G1 and G2 obtained in (42) into (39) and
(40), we obtain
u1 =
V1
(1 + )2
f1 + (1  q) (2 + )g and (43)
u2 =
V2
(1 + )2

2 + (1  q) [1 + 2]	 (44)
When information about the moves of the other country is perfect, i.e., q = 1,
(43) and (44) collapse into (8) and (9). When q = 0, countries can successfully
hide their movements, so they expect to conquer the resource without any ght.
Thus, ui = Vi.10 Notice that the expected payo¤s from war decrease with q.
We now evaluate the benets of peace. In the unmediated case, if both
countries do not declare war, they cannot ght for the resource under dispute,
so they get zero anyway. Thus, as it happened under complete information, we
have that:
Proposition 7 Under imperfect observability, war is the only equilibrium out-
come of the unmediated game.
We now turn to the mediated case. Here the mediator suggests that country
one takes a share " 2 (0; 1) in the resource. Suppose that when, say, country
10Actually, this is only true at the limit, since when the army built by, say, country two is
zero, there is no best reply for country one; i.e., the payo¤ for country one gets larger as long
as its war expenses go to zero. But at the limit, the CSF is not dened.
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two has chosen not to declare war, country one perceives that country two has
declared war with probability 1   o where o 2 (0; 1). In the previous analysis
o = 1. Thus, expected payo¤s of peace are
u1 = o"V1 and (45)
u2 = o(1  ")V2: (46)
Notice that under perfect observability, o = 1, expressions (45) and (46) are
reduced to those under complete information. Thus, peace holds i¤
1  
2 + (1  q) (1 + 2)
o(1 + )2
 "  1 + (1  q)  (2 + )
o(1 + )2
; (47)
which, given that the bounds in (47) guarantee that " 2 [0; 1], it amounts to
o  1 + 
2 + (1  q)(1 + 2 +  (2 + ))
(1 + )2
(48)
Under full information, q = 1 and o = 1, so (48) is now
1  (1 + )
2   2
(1 + )
2 (49)
and mediation is always feasible.
The following propositions yield conditions for mediation to be (or not to
be) successful. Before this, let us introduce a new denition. Let
F (o; ; q)  o(1 + )2   1  2   (1  q)(1 + 2 +  (2 + )): (50)
From (48), it follows that peace holds i¤ F (o; ; q)  0. We are now prepared
to study the impact of o;  and q on the feasibility of mediation. Since the im-
plications of our results are similar, we will discuss them after the propositions.
Proposition 8 If q(1 + 4 + 2)  (1 + )2; 9o^, such that 8o < o^ war occurs
and 8o > o^ mediation can be successful. If q(1+ 4 + 2) < (1+ )2, mediation
cannot be successful irrespective of the value of o.
Proof. Obviously, F (; ; q) is increasing in o. Now we compute
F (0; ; q) =  2   (1  q) (2 +  ( + 2) + 1)  1
F (1; ; q) = q   2 + 4q   2 + q2   1
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Thus, F (0; ; q) < 0. Therefore, if F (1; ; q)  0, by the intermediate value
theorem, there is a o^ such that F (o^; ; q) = 0. Given that F (; ; q) is increasing
in o, this point is unique and the proposition follows.
Finally, if F (1; ; q) < 0 since F (; ; q) is increasing in o, F (o; ; q) < 0 8o and
mediation is impossible:
Proposition 9 If o ( + 1)2  2 +1, there is a value of q, q^, such that for all
q < q^ war occurs, and for all q > q^, mediation can be successful. If o ( + 1)2 <
2 + 1, mediation cannot be successful irrespective of the value of q.
Proof. Obviously, F (o; ; ) is increasing in q. We now compute
F (o; ; 0) = o  4 + 2o   22 + o2   2
F (o; ; 1) = o ( + 1)
2   2   1:
Since F (o; ; 0) is increasing in o and F (1; ; 0) =  2 2 1 < 0, F (o; ; 0) <
0. Thus, if F (o; ; 1)  0 by the intermediate value theorem, q^ exists and, since
F (o; ; ) is increasing in q, is unique.
Finally, if F (o; ; 1) < 0 since F (o; ; ) is increasing in q, F (o; ; q) < 0 8q and
mediation is impossible:
Proposition 10 If :5o+:75q > 1, there is an interval [; ] such that mediation
can be successful i¤  2 [; ]. If :5o + :75q < 1, mediation can never be
successful.
Proof. We rst check that @2F (o; ; q)=@2 < 0, so F (o; ; q) is strictly concave.
Now we solve F (o; ; q) = 0, whose largest solution is
 =
o+ 2q   2 +
p
 4q + 2oq + 3q2
2  o  q (51)
The expression under the root is positive i¤ 2o+3q > 4. This implies o+2q > 2,
so the  found in (51) is positive: Note that lim!0 F (o; ; q) = o + q   2 < 0
and lim!1 F (o; ; q) =  1, so the value of  found in (51) is . The smallest
value of F (o; ; q) = 0 serves as . If this value does not exist take  = 0.
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Finally, the last part of the proposition follows from the fact that, as we note
before, F (o; ; q) is negative at the extremes, so if the interval where F (o; ; q) 
0 does not exist, F (o; ; q) < 0 for all .
Propositions 8-10 assert that, as expected, good observability is good for
peace. But inequality in the valuations of countries has an important role, too,
since the condition in proposition 8 (resp. 9) can be written as q  (1+)2=(1+
4+ 2) (resp. o  (2+1)= ( + 1)2).11 The expression on the right hand side
of this inequality has a minimum at  = 1 and tends to 1 when  ! 0 or
 ! 1. Thus, high or low values of  make mediation more di¢ cult. This is
also seen in proposition 10. Note that the minimum of (1 + )2=(1 + 4 + 2)
(resp. (2 + 1)= ( + 1)2) is 2=3 (resp. 1=2). Thus, any value of q (resp o) less
than 2=3 (resp. 1=2) makes war unstoppable.
Finally, we remark that an implication of Propositions 8-10 is that, given any
degree of precision in the observability of o and q, a su¢ ciently large di¤erence
in valuations makes peace impossible.
6 Final Comments
In this paper, we study how mediation can stop war. We show that a little asym-
metric information or observability problems when valuations between countries
are very di¤erent may cause mediation to fail.
In order to make the model tractable, we have made a number of assumptions
and leave aside some questions that we discuss now.
1. We assumed that after war, no compensation is paid by the loser. But
there are several historical examples showing otherwise, i.e., the Franco-Prussian
War (1870-1), World War I (1914-1918), etc. Farmer and Pecorino (1999) have
shown that when the loser has to pay the expenses of the winner, total expenses
might sky-rocket due to the fact that the winner pays nothing. It would be
interesting to know the possibilities of mediation under this case. Given that
11Since (1+)
2
(1+4+2)
>
(2+1)
(+1)2
the condition on q is more demanding than the condition on
o.
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payo¤s under war are smaller than under no compensation, intuition suggests
that mediation can work even better in this case than under no compensation,
which is the case considered in our paper.
2. When stopping the war for both types becomes impossible, it is not clear
what a peace-seeking mediator should do. For instance, she might suggest a
mediation that would stop war if country one would be of the low type. This
would give room for peace to hold, at least for some cases.
3. Another extension is to consider a political bias as in Jackson and Morelli
(2007). In this paper, the agent running a country might receive high prots
from the victory but pay only a fraction of the cost of war. In this case, it looks
like if the bias is su¢ ciently large, mediation cannot be successful, even under
complete information. This would add to our list of mediation failures.
4. Finally, mediation usually takes place in several rounds. It would be
interesting to model mediation as in the model of Rubinstein (1982).
We hope that our paper sheds light on the powers and limitations of medi-
ation and pinpoints the cases in which mediation is bound to fail. Therefore,
other measures like a direct UN intervention have to be taken.
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